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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 970490

vs.

:
;
:

CHAD STATEN,

::

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

;

JURISDICTION OF Tgg UTAH SUPREME COURT
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section
78-2a-3(2) (e) .

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in its denial of Staten's

motion to suppress evidence and in finding the warrantless search
of Staten's motel room to be justified by "exigent circumstances"
or as a proper search incident-to-arrest?

"The factual findings

of a trial court that underlie its decision to grant or deny a
motion to suppress will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly
erroneous.

The trial court's *legal conclusions are reviewed for

correctness, with a measure of discretion given to the trial
judge's application of the legal standard to the facts.'" State
v- Wellsr 928 P.2d 386, 388 (Utah App. 1996) (citations omitted).
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This issue was preserved in a pre-trial motions and at a
suppression hearing (R. 22, 29-33, 50-63, 144-189).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
United States Constitution, Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Utah Constitution, Article I, section 14
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause supported by oath and affirmation
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
person or thing to be seized.

STATEMENT
Jt.

QF Tgg

C^SS

Nature of the Case
Chad Staten appeals from the judgment, sentence and order of

Probation by the Honorable Lynn W. Davis, Fourth District Court,
on September 15, 1997, after the denial of Staten1s Motion to
Suppress Evidence and the entry of a condition 1 plea to
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute in
a Drug Free Zone, a first degree felony, and Possession of a
Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a Third Degree Felony.
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B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Staten was charged by information filed on or about January

14, 1997, with three violations of the controlled substances act
and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person (R.
6-7) .
After a preliminary hearing (R. 16-18, 103-142) and the
entry of "not guilty" pleas at arraignment (R. 20-21), Staten
filed a Motion to Suppress the Evidence under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States and Article I, Section 14 of the
Utah Constitution (R. 22-33).

Staten argued that the warrantless

search of his motel room was without his consent and was not
justified by "exigent circumstances" (Id.).
On May 9, 1997, a suppression hearing was conducted before
Judge Davis and the matter was taken under advisement (R. 47-48,
144-190).

The trial court subsequently denied in part, and

granted in part, Staten' Motion to Suppress (R. 66-74).
Staten entered a conditional plea of "guilty" to Possession
of Methamphetamine with Intent to Distribute in a Drug Free Zone,
a first degree felony, and Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a
Restricted Person, a third degree felony (R. 84-87); and he was
sentenced to thirty-six months probation and a year in the Utah
County Jail (R. 90-91).

On October 14, 1997, Staten filed a

Notice of Appeal with the Fourth District Court challenging the
trial court's denial of his motion to suppress (R. 98-99).
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
At approximately 7:00 p.m. on December 22, 1996, Officer
Greg Henigar of the Provo City Police Department was dispatched
to the Motel 6 based upon information concerning a run-away
female juvenile (R. 158-60).

Dispatch informed Henigar that the

juvenile was staying at the motel "with a person by the first
name of Chad" (R. 161).
Henigar responded to the Motel 6 and gave the front desk the
information he had from dispatch (R. 161). The front desk
informed him that a female matching the given description and a
male by the name of Chad had been at the motel (R. 161).

Henigar

then went outside and conducted surveillence on the hotel room he
had been given by the front desk (R. 162).
Henigar called the motel room from his patrol car and spoke
with a male who informed Henigar that the female juvenile was not
in the room but that she would be back soon (R. 162-63) .

Henigar

testified that he also asked the male if he had "some stuff" (R.
164).

Henigar testified that the male replied "Yes, I think I

know what you need" (R. 164). After the phone call, Henigar
called for back-up and was joined by Officer Ashcroft (R. 16465) .
Henigar and Ashcroft then observed a vehicle drive-up and
saw a female go inside the motel room (R. 165).

Henigar then

phoned the room again, spoke with the same unidentified male and
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asked to speak with the juvenile female (R. 165) . After speaking
briefly with the female, Henigar spoke again with the male (R.
166).

Henigar testified that he asked the male "What can you get

me?" to which the male replied, "I can get you some bitch"
166).

(R.

Henigar testified that "bitch" is a street name for

methamphetamine (Id.).
Several minutes later, the female exited the room and was
stopped by Henigar and Ashcroft (R. 166). Henigar asked for her
name and was informed that she was the female juvenile for whom
he had been looking (R. 167). Henigar took her into custody, put
her in the backseat of Ashcroft!s vehicle, and asked her what was
on her person (R. 167). The female juvenile replied that "she
had some smokes" and some methamphetamine which she then removed
from her underwear (R. 167). The juvenile informed Henigar that
she got the drugs from the motel room "for a guy who wanted it"
(R. 168).

Soon after the juvenile's arrest her brother and his

friend approached the scene (R. 170).
Heningar had the friend, Tim Hansen, assist him in
approaching the motel room (R. 170-71).

Hansen knocked on the

door while Henigar stood off to the side (R. 171).

Staten

answered the door and Heningar moved to the front and began
speaking with him (R. 171).
Henigar testified that when the door opened, he looked
around the room from outside and noticed some scales in plain

5

view on the desk next to the door and what appeared to be a
marijuana pipe on a nightstand (R. 171). Henigar then asked
Staten for consent to retrieve the pipe (R. 172).

Henigar

testified that Staten gave him consent (R. 172).
Henigar then walked into the room, picked-up the pipe, and
found it be a butane nozzle (R. 172). At this point, Henigar
noticed several butane torches and butane tanks in the desk area
as well as some baggies (R. 172).
Henigar then "froze the environment" to protect the scene,
placed Staten in hand-cuffs, and waited for assistance (R. 173,
175).

Henigar left the room for a period of time in the charge

of Officer Woodall (R. 180). At some point NET officers arrived
at the scene (R. 176); and methamphetamine and marijuana were
found in a planner tucked in between the mattress, and a loaded
weapon was also found in the room (R. 119, 130, 174, 176).
Staten was placed under arrest (R. 176).
Tim Hansen testified that on the day in question, he and the
juvenile female's brother were looking for the female in the
motel area of South University Avenue in Provo (R. 147).

When

they arrived at the Motel 6, Hansen testified that law
enforcement personnel were already present and that the female
juvenile was being arrested (R. 147-48).
Hansen testified that one of the officers had him knock on
the door of the motel room "so Chad would answer it" (R. 148).
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Hansen testified that he did not know "Chad" (R. 148).
Hansen knocked, Chad opened the door (R. 148-49).
"arrested him.

When

Then Henigar

He was talking to him and asked him if he could

look around and Chad said that no, you need a warrant" (R. 149).
Then Hansen testified:
in the corner.

"I seen what looked like a marijuana pipe

I pointed it out to him and he asked him if we

could look and Chad said that yes, you can go over and look at
it.

It is not a pipe.

at it and put it down.

He walked in and picked it up and looked
It is not a pipe" (R. 149).

Hansen

testified that at this point, he had seen nothing else that might
be related to drugs (R. 150). Hansen also testified that he
believed Staten was already hand-cuffed when Henigar retrieved
the alleged pipe (R. 153). Hansen testified that he could not
recall if Henigar informed Staten that he was placing the
handcuffs on him for "officer safety" (R. 155).
Staten testified that when Hansen and Henigar came to the
door of the motel room, Henigar asked if there was a pipe on the
table, but not for consent to search the room (R. 184).

Staten

also testified that he told Henigar that he would need a warrant
to look in the room (R. 184).

Staten did tell Henigar that he

could look at the pipe and that he planned on retrieving it for
Henigar, but before that happened, Henigar came into the room (R.
184-85).
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Staten was hand-cuffed and he testified that approximately
twenty minutes later Officer Billings from NET arrived (R. 186).
Staten also testified that Henigar at some point left the room
and that at some point he was left alone in the room (R. 186).
On May 9, 1997, a suppression hearing was conducted before
Judge Davis and the matter was taken under advisement (R. 47-48,
144-190).

The trial court subsequently denied in part, and

granted in part, Staten' Motion to Suppress (R. 66-74).
Relevant to the issues of this appeal, the trial court found
that Staten's failure to consent to the search of the room was
not dispositive because "evidence was in plain view from the
doorway" and "there was ample probable cause to effectuate an
arrest of the defendant, and the officer could have entered the
room for that purpose without consent or invitation by the
defendant" (R. 70). The trial court also found that the seizure
of the drugs found in a planner that was "tucked between the
mattresses one-half way between the headboard and the foot of the
bed" was justified under an exigent circumstances theory or as
part of a legitimate search incident to an arrest (R. 69, 71,
119) .

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Warrantless searches of homes—or motel rooms—are violative
of Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourth
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Amendment to the United States Constitution unless conducted
pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.
In this case, the trial court concluded that the warrantless
searches of Staten's motel room were justified either under an
"exigent circumstances" theory or as a proper search incident to
arrest.

Staten asserts that the trial court's decision is

erroneous.

One, because no exigent circumstances were present at

the time of the second search which negated the need for a
warrant.

Two, because the second search did not meet the

requirements of a proper search incident to arrest.

It was not

necessary for the protection of the police or the preservation of
the evidence nor were the items seized within the immediate
control of Staten at the time of their seizure.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS DENIAL OF STATEN'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE
WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF STATEN' S MOTEL ROOM WAS REASONABLE
Both Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protect
individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures.

These

constitutional protections extend to unreasonable searches of
motel rooms.
See

also,

Stoner v. California. 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964).

Hoffa v. United States. 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966)
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("A

hotel room can clearly be the object of Fourth Amendment
protection as much as a home or an office").

In addition,

"warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless undertaken
pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement."
State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992) (citation omitted).
Moreover, the "State must demonstrate *that the circumstances of
the seizure constitute an exception to the warrant requirement.'"
Wells. 928 P.2d at 389 (citation omitted).
In this case, the State conducted two warrantless searches
of Staten's motel room.

The first occurred when Henigar entered

the room and found various items or paraphernalia and a weapon
after placing Staten in handcuffs (R. 172, 173).

The second

warrantless search occurred when Henigar and other officers
returned to the motel room and conducted a more thorough
inventory search of the room—including a search in between the
mattresses where a planner containing methamphetamine was found
(R. 119, 130, 174, 176).
Staten asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that
the State had sustained its burden of establishing that the
circumstances surrounding these searches of Staten's motel room
constitute an exception to the warrant requirement under either
an "exigent circumstances" theory or as a proper search incident
to arrest.

Staten particularly challenges the trial court's

conclusion that the second search of the room—which resulted in
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the discovery of the methamphetamine and which was conducted
long-after Staten had been handcuffed—was justified.

A.

The warrantless searches of Staten's motel room were not
justified by "exigent circumstances."
A warrantless search of a residence or a motel room is

"constitutionally permissible where probable cause and exigent
circumstances are proven."
(Utah App. 1997).

State v. Yoder. 935 P.2d 534, 540

Such an exception exists to prevent physical

harm to law enforcement personnel or others, the destruction of
evidence, or the escape of the suspect.

Yoder, 935 P.2d at 540

(citing State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9f 13 (Utah App. 1993)).
However, "exigent circumstances exist

A

only when the inevitable

delay incident to obtaining a warrant must give way to an urgent
need for immediate action.'" Wells. 928 P.2d at 389 (quoting
United States v. Satterfielri. 743 F.2d 827, 844 (11th Cir.
1984)).
In State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1993), this court
concluded "[t]he existence of exigent circumstances must be based
on the reasonable belief of the police officer."

859 P.2d at 18.

Moreover, "the mere possibility that a suspect may have a weapon
or that evidence might be destroyed is insufficient."
P.2d at 389 (citations omitted).

WeiIsf 928

In this case, any initial

exigencies had dissipated at the time of the second search.
Wellsr 928 P.2d at 389.

See,

One, Henigar had already done a cursory
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search of the room for weapons and officer safety.
had already been placed in handcuffs.

Two, Staten

Three, the motel room had

been frozen and there was no danger that evidence would be
destroyed before a warrant could be obtained.
In State v. Wellsr this court concluded that the trial court
erred in failing to suppress cocaine which was found in the
lining of defendant's jacket after officers had executed arrest
warrants on the defendant and handcuffed both suspects at the
home.

928 P.2d at 389.

In its decision this court noted "The

record relfects that both suspects were handcuffed and in custody
when the cocaine was seized.... The officers had controlled the
initially chaotic situation by the time they searched the jacket.
Therefore, the initial exigencies which had dissipated by the
time of the search, could not have justified the cocaine
seizure."

Wells, 928 P.2d at 389.

Unlike the suspects in Wells. Staten was never anything but
cooperative with the police.

He never made any attempt to escape

or to harm the officers or to destroy evidence.

However, this

case is similar to the circumstances in Wells because by the time
other officers arrived at the scene—and

by the time the

mattresses were searched and the methamphetamine located—any
initial exigencies had dissipated.

Accordingly, Staten urges

this court to conclude that the trial court erred in finding that
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"exigent circumstances" justified the second warrantless search
of Staten's motel room.

B.

The trial court erred in concluding that the second
warrantless search of Staten's motel room was a proper
search incident to arrest.
As an alternative to its "exigent circumstances" theory, the

trial court concluded that the second warrantless search of
Staten's motel room was a proper search incident to arrest.
set forth supra,

As

two warrantless searches of Staten's motel room

were made by officers.
The second search, which was conducted by Henigar and
subsequently NET officers, is at issue here.

This search was

conducted long-after Staten had been handcuffed and taken into
police custody; and it centers on the officers' search of the
mattresses whereat methamphetamine was located inside of a
planner which was "tucked between the mattresses one-half way
between the headboard and the foot of the bed" (R. 71).
Warrantless searches incident to a lawful arrest are
permitted "when reasonable and necessary to (1) protect the
police officer or third persons (the search and seizure of
weapons) and (2) prevent the destruction of evidence that is
within the immediate control of the arrestee."

State v. Austin,

584 P.2d 853, 855 (Utah 1978) (citing Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752 (1969).
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In Austin, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial court's
conclusion that evidence found in a hotel trash linking the
suspects to a robbery was properly obtained as a search incident
to arrest.

The court based its decision on several factors: One,

the search was restricted to a single room.

584 P.2d at 856,

Two, an attempt had already been made to destroy the evidence at
issue.

584 P.2d at 587.

Three, the evidence was found in a

trash can and could have been inadvertantly destroyed by hotel
personnel.

Id.

Four, because there could be "no assumption that

the receipts would remain in the same place until they could
return with a proper warrant.

Id.

Unlike Austinf the search of Staten's motel room may or may
not have been limited to a single room.

The trial court's ruling

acknowledges this factual uncertainty: "[T]he State fails to
produce sufficient evidence regarding the motel room layout; were
there two rooms... or only one room?" (R. 68). Likewise, there
had been no attempt by Staten to destroy evidence.

Finally,

motel personnel had been apprised of the situation and were
working in tandem with law enforcement personnel.

Therefore,

evidence was not likely to be inadvertently destroyed before a
warrant could be obtained.
In short, in this case this was no concern for officer
safety or the destruction of evidence when officers engaged in
the second warrantless search of Staten's motel room.
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In

addition, Staten asserts that the drugs found in the planner
during this second search were not in his "immediate control" as
required for a proper warrantless search incident to arrest.
In State v. Wells, 928 P.2d 386 (Utah App. 1996), this court
set forth factors for determining whether items seized in a
warrantless search incident to arrest were within a defendant's
control: One, "whether or not the arrestee was placed in some
form of restraints."

928 P.2d at 391.

In this case, Staten had

been handcuffed and taken into custody long before this second
search occurred (R. 71).
Two, "the position of the officer vis-a-vis the defendant in
relation to the place searched."

Id.

The defendant was

handcuffed and seated in a chair with at least three officers in
the motel room when the second search occurred (R. 71).
Three, "the ease or difficulty of gaining access to the
searched area or item."

Wellsr 928 P.2d at 391.

The planner

containing the methamphetamine was found in between the
mattresses—an area in which Staten was not likely to have access
to given his custodial status and the number of officers present.
Four, "the number of officers present in relation to the
number of arrestees or other persons."

928 P.2d at 391.

In this

case there was one arrestee and several officers.
Because there was no danger to officer safety or no
possibility of the destruction of evidence, and because the
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evidence found in the second search was not in the immediate
control of the defendant, Staten asks this court to conclude that
the second warrantless search of his motel room was not justified
as a proper search incident to arrest.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Staten respectfully asks that this Court conclude that the
trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and in
concluding that the warrantless searches of his motel room were
justified either under an "exigent circumstances'' theory or as a
proper search incident to arrest.

Accordingly, Staten asks that

this court reverse his conviction and remand the matter to the
district court with directions that Staten's plea may be
withdrawn and with orders to suppress the illegally obtained
evidence.
/ / day
is-ZZ.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

of February, 1998

Ih'^y^Ja^d.
Margaret P. Lindsay
Counsel for Staten

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct
copies of the foregoing Brief Of Appellant to the Appeals
Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor,
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P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this /*?

day of

February, 1998.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UT/JU'VuNTV f ' \ "EOF UTAH
5iAiJ2, 0 1

UiAH

Plaintiff,

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
CASE NO. 971400044

vs.

DATE: JULY 15, 1997
JUDGE: LYNN W. DAVIS

CHAD STATEN
Defendant.

CLERK: SGJ

Chad Staten is charged with Possession of Methamphetamine with Intent to
Distribute in a Drug Free Zone, a First Degree Felony; Possession of Marijuana with Intent to
Distribute in a Drug Free Zone, a Second Degree Felony; Possession of Paraphernalia in a
Drug Free Zone, a Class A Misdemeanor; and Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by
Restricted Person, a Third Degree Felony.
A preliminary hearing was conducted on May 23, 1997. The Court found that there
was probable cause that the offenses were committed and that the defendant committed the
offenses.
The defendant filed a Motion to Suppress on March 26, 1997, supported by a
Memorandum of Points and Authorities. The State of Utah filed a Response to Defendant's
Motion to Suppress on May 5, 1997.
A suppression hearing was conducted on May 9, 1997, and the defense sought leave
to file a reply memorandum. A Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to
Suppress was filed on June 4, 1997. The State of Utah filed a Request to Submit For
Decision on June 12, 1997. This judge conducted both the preliminary hearing and
suppression hearing. The defendant has relied upon a transcript of both hearings and the
Court will rely upon the testimony in both hearings in this ruling.

0074

L
FACTS
"The factual findings of a trial court that underlie its decision to grant or deny a
motion to suppress will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous." State v. Davis,
821 P.2d 9, 11. The Court adopts, in part, the facts as set forth in the State's memorandum,
subject to various significant clarifications made in the hearings.
On December 22, 1996, officers in Provo, Utah were trying to locate Megan
Kearley, a sixteen-year-old runaway. Officers received information that Megan might he at
the Motel 6 in Provo on South University Avenue, and that she was thought to be staying
with a male individual by the first name of Chad. The officer went to the front desk of the
Motel 6 and described Megan and "Chad" to the person at the front desk. A teller or
manager at the front desk indicated that they did have a young female fitting the description
staying in a room (208 in the preliminary hearing; 263 in the suppression hearing) that was
rented to a "Chad Staten." They gave the officers the driver's license number which was
used as identification to rent the room. Dispatch confirmed the license number as Chad
Staten's. The person at the front desk also said that they thought that Megan had called to
the room from somewhere else a few minutes before.
The officer then went across the street and called the room registered to Chad Staten
and asked for Megan. The male individual who answered the phone said that Megan was not
there but should be back soon. The male attempted to get the officer to give his name, and
then there was some discussion in which the officer indicated that it was very important that
he get in touch with Megan. The male indicated that he thought he knew what the officer
needed and that he might be able to help him. The officer then asked the defendant if he had
some "stuff to which the defendant replied that he thought he knew what the officer needed
and that the officer should call back in ten minutes. Officer Heniger testified that kids that
have pagers that (the police) deal with usually have some ties with drugs.

2

0073

The officer then began calling the narcotics officers and for back-up. Before the
r,tUr->r
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and ? female fitting Megan's

description got out of the vehicle and went into room 263. After waiting a few more minutes
Officer Heniger called room 263 again and talked to Megan. She said that he should talk to
"Chad" and handed the phone to him. Defendant told the officer that he could get him some
"bitch." Officer Heniger testified that "bitch" is a street name for methamphetamine. The
officer told defendant he would be right over. Megan was then observed leaving room 263
and entering a vehicle. She was stopped and placed under arrest as a runaway, and she was
taken into custody.
Megan had in her possession a small zip-lock baggie of rock methamphetamine.
She said that she had gotten it from the defendant in the motel room. When Megan was
placed in custody she requested to be allowed to go up to the room where the defendant was,
and on the terrace, balcony level of the second level she began to scream about two doors
from the defendant's room. She continued to scream as the officers then took her back down
the stairs and secured her. Officer Heniger believed the defendant could hear the screaming,
and Megan was attempting to alert and warn the defendant that there was a problem.
Next, the officer asked a friend of Megan's, Tim Hansen, to go with him to room
263. Officer Heniger explained his reason for taking a civilian appearance as follows:
The exact reason if he (Staten) saw a uniformed officer and he had already
offered me narcotics over the phone and if he saw a uniformed officer he
doesn't have to open up the door. He could just go and flush everything
down the toilet. (Transcript, Suppression Hearing at 27)
The officer was to the side where he could not be seen as the defendant opened the
door. Once the door was opened, the officer stepped out facing the defendant. From this
position outside the door, the officer could see baggies, a copper pipe and several boxes that
said "scales" on them. The baggies were similar to the ones that the methamphetamine was
in that was found on Megan's person. Tim Hansen pointed to the copper pipe and said,
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"Look, there is a marijuana pipe." Defendant denied it was a marijuana pipe, and when the
officer asked if the officer could come in to retrieve it, the defendant agreed. The defendant
denied the officer's request to search the premises; he would not let them search without a
warrant.
The officer, from the doorway, and when he entered the room, was able to observe
several items of paraphernalia in plain view; the copper butane nozzle which both he and the
civilian thought looked like a marijuana pipe, baggies and a box marked "scales." The
baggies were identical to the one produced by Megan; very small, an inch by inch baggie
with a little zip-lock on top. When the officer retrieved the item which was actually copper
tubing attached to a blow torch, he also noticed several butane torches and several butane
tanks underneath the same nightstand/desk area.
The defendant was then "taken into custody" in the room and handcuffed and asked
to be seated in a chair near the foot of one of the beds. At this point Officer Heniger was the
only officer in the room. Officer Heniger then made a very cursory search for weapons.
A loaded, pistol grip, shotgun without a stock, was recovered within a few feet of
the front door and within "lunge area" of the defendant. The weapon was secured.
The facts now are muddled, but what is clear is that the officer waited about fifteen
minutes for NET (Narcotics Enforcement Team) officers to arrive. NET officers
"inventoried" the items in the room, finding several baggies of methamphetamine, marijuana,
digital scales and additional shotgun shells.
A NET officer asked the defendant for identification. The defendant said
identification was in the planner. A planner had been recovered tucked between the
mattresses one-half way between the headboard and the foot of the bed. The officer opened
the planner to obtain the ID and located baggies of drugs and a set of small scales.
There were no third persons in the motel room until Chad Staten was arrested. But
there was no testimony whether a bathroom was separate from the sleeping room.
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It is important to note that Officer Heniger is a new officer, with two years of
e^^r:?:' ~\

T

"'ion, if :•- :n^nortant tc --~i- •- ' ue is a patrol^' rt r

>T

°xt, it is irr~-ortant to

note that the Motel 6 room is small, consisting of two beds, and the nightstand was about ten
feet from the front door.

n.
Consent to Search, Plain View and Exigent Circumstance
The defendant's argument that he did not give consent to enter the room is
misplaced. Evidence was in plain view from the doorway. Expectations of privacy do not
extend to evidence which is in plain view. In addition, there was ample probable cause to
effectuate an arrest of the defendant, and the officer could have entered the room for that
purpose without consent or invitation by the defendant.
Even prior to the officer approaching the defendant's room, the officer had already
engaged the defendant in a conversation, by phone in which Megan identified the person the
officer was speaking to as Chad and the individual identified agreed to sell the officer
controlled substances. At that point the defendant had already arguably committed the crime
of agreeing to sell controlled substances which gave the officer probable cause for arrest and
to search for the substances. It was not unreasonable for the officer to assume that there were
controlled substances in the room since defendant had just agreed to sell him some from the
room, and Megan had indicated that she had gotten the substances from the defendant in
room 263. Arguably he had sold or supplied drugs to Megan, a minor, and may have
harbored a runaway juvenile. Drug paraphernalia was viewed from the doorway and the
officer had probable cause to arrest him for this offense.
In the recent case of State v. Well, 304 Utah Advance Reports 6 (November 21,
1996) the Court of Appeals of Utah stated the basis for determining exigent circumstances.
The Court stated,
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Utah courts have identified several exigent circumstances that may justify a
warrantless search, including the immediate need to prevent harm to the
officers, destruction of evidence, or escape of the subject. Wells at 8.
(Citations omitted).
At least initially, all of the above factors are possible in this case given the fact that
Megan was attempting to warn the defendant and that the defendant already had reason to be
suspicious given the phone calls made by the officer and the fact that he was dealing drugs.
The co-defendant was already under arrest and was attempting to warn the
defendant. Had officers waited to obtain a warrant, it is likely the defendant may have left or
the evidence destroyed, secreted or dissipated.
The Wells court further sets forth the standard as follows:
As is the standard in all search and seizure cases, whether a search is
reasonable under the incident-to-arrest exception depends on the particular
facts of each case. See State v. Austin, 584 P.2d 853 855 (Utah 1978).
Under this exception, an officer may search the area within the arrestee's
"immediate control" to prevent the arrestee from obtaining weapons or
destroying evidence. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 766, 89 S.
Ct. 2034, 2040-41, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1969); Austin, 584 P.2d at 855; State
v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 784 (Utah App.), cert denied, 817 P.2d 327
(Utah 1991).
The pistol grip, fully loaded, shotgun was recovered within a few feet of the
defendant. The gun was within the immediate control of the defendant and was properly and
constitutionally seized.
Beyond the seizure of the pistol grip shotgun, the court must determine whether a
further search was allowed under an exigent circumstance or search incident to arrest theory.
Utah courts have focused on the totality of the factual circumstances to determine if the area
searched was within the arrestee's immediate control.
As set forth in Utah v. Austin, 584 P.2d 853, a defendant who is in custody need
not be physically able to move about in order to justify a search within a limited area once an
arrest has been made.
6
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While handcuffed, this defendant was not further restrained and he could, if he
;.rsicaS!y movv.. an
iv

:int !-:

dispositive of

r mtrol."
State v. Austin, 584 P.2d 853, also stands for the proposition that there are inherent

differences an arrest at a hotel creates; evidence could inadvertently be removed or destroyed
by hotel cleaning maids. This motel room is very small and defendant, prior to and past
constraint, had easy access to the searched area. He was within four feet of the planner, for
example.
Finally, the State fails to produce sufficient evidence regarding the motel room
layout; were there two rooms (a living space and a bathroom) or only one room? If there was
come

.u;,.iii Uc-.in access to ;.u.> loom

Weie nerns oi
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There is no evidence regarding the location of several items which were seized; the
pager; cellular phone and video tapes. The Court, absent testimony regarding location, cannot
determine whether the item was within the defendant's "immediate control." Most of the
evidence comes in under a plain view exception, an exigent circumstance exception, or search
incident to arrest. But the State has failed to carry its burden as to some evidence.
Item Seized

Suppressed

Legal & Constitutional
Justification to Allow
Evidence

1. Pistol Grip, loaded 12
guage shotgun, without
stock

No

Exigent circumstance,
plain view and search
incident to arrest

2. Butane torch,
copper/brass attachments,
cans of butane

No

Plain view as
paraphernalia
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3. Box of scales

No

Plain view and search
incident to arrest witlvn
suspect's control

4. Baggies, and baggies
in shaving kit

No

Plain view as
paraphernalia and search
incident to arrest within
suspects' control

5. Ice Scraper*

No

Search incident to arrest
within suspect's control

6. Shotgun shells

No

In plain view on
nightstand and search
incident to arrest within
suspect's control

7. Scales and baggies
from planner

No

Search incident to arrest
within suspect's control

8. False video tapes

Yes

Insufficient testimony as
to location to determine if
within suspect's control

9. Pager

Yes

Insufficient testimony as
to location to determine if
within suspect's control

10. Cellular phone

Yes

Insufficient testimony as
to location to determine if
within suspect's control

The search incident to arrest was "properly confined to a limited area within the

*See testimony regarding ice scraper that alerted officers that it contained drugs.
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.peers control." The se"-?h was limited to :. , l w a from within which Te might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. Chimel v. California
III.
RULING
Based upon the above facts and the applicable law, defendant's motion is granted in
-. ;-Oc anc

. . part.
Counsel for defendant is instructed to prepare an order consistent with this ruling.
Dated this

/ £

day of July, 1997.
BY THE COURT

cc:

Sherry Ragan, Esq.
Randy Spencer, Esq.
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STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND
REQUEST FOR HEARING

Plaintiff,
vs.

CASE NO. 971400044

CHAD STATEN,

JUDGE LYNN W. DAVIS
Defendant.

Defendant, CHAD STATEN, through his counsel of record, Randall K. Spencer,
moves the Court to suppress evidence gathered subsequent to the warrantless search of
Defendant and his motel room which resulted in the charges in the present case. Defendant's
motion is made pursuant to Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourth Amendment
of the United States Constitution. Additionally, Defendant requests that the Court schedule
this matter for a hearing on Defendant's motion.
Dated this^Y/

day of March, 1997.
Randall K. Spencer c-/
Attorney for Defendant
MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered a copy of the foregoing to the Office of
the Utah County Attorney, 100 East Center, Suite 2100, Provo, UT 84606, this ^ ^
day of_
itM i ',-» . 1997.

'Yl'lcLgcACuvi ^uJotn*0022

FOURTH JUDiC!AL"5fSTRfCT COURT
UrlSTfr
^UTAH

Randall K. Spencer (6992)
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
Attorneys for Defendant
40 South 100 West, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone 379-2570

MAR 2 6 1997
— DEPUTY

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS

Plaintiff,
vs.

CASE NO. 971400044

CHADSTATEN

JUDGE LYNN W. DAVIS

Defendant.

Defendant, CHAD STATEN, through his counsel of record, Randall K. Spencer,
submits the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's
Motion to Suppress.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
1.

On or about December 22, 1996, Officer Henninger from the Provo Police Department

went to Motel 6 on a belief that a run-away juvenile may be staying at the motel.
2.

Officer Henninger believed that the juvenile was staying with Chad Staten in room

#263.
3.

The run-away juvenile was apprehended in a vehicle in the motel room parking lot, and

she produced some methamphetamine that she indicated she got from "the motel room."
4.

Officer Henninger had previously called the motel room and allegedly arranged to

purchase some methamphetamine from the motel room.
1

5.

A civilian, Tim Hansen, was also present to assist in securing the run-away juvenile,

and Officer Henninger requested that Mr. Hansen accompany him to the motel room where he
believed Chad Staten was located.
rw

6.

ncer Henninger instruc .:: ""•••-; Hansen to knock at the door, while ;.-e himself

stepped out of view.
7.
•-

rr

After Tim Hansen did as the officer requested, Chad Staten opened the door, and the
• .'lep^^d i»ito view and identiH:^ ^""nisc!^

8.

Officer Henninger asked for consent to search the room and Chad Staten did not give

consent.
9.

Mr. Hansen observed what he believed to be a marijuana pipe on the night stand.

10.

Contrary to what the testimony from Mr. Staten will be, Officer Henninger alleges that

Mr. Staten consented to Officer Henninger entering the room to retrieve the pipe.
11.

Officer Henninger retrieved the object believed to be a marijuana pipe, and

immediately discovered that it was not a marijuana pipe, but was part of a butane torch assembly.
12.

Officer Henninger placed hand-cuffs on Mr. Staten, left the room, and Mr. Hansen

remained outside the motel room to make sure Mr. Staten did not run away.
13.

Officer Henninger told the Mr. Hansen that he was leaving to get a warrant to search

the room.
14.

Officer Henninger returned shortly after leaving the motel room with additional

officers, took Defendant into custody, and searched the motel room without a warrant.
ARGUMENT
I.

MR. STATEN WAS SEIZED AND HIS MOTEL ROOM WAS ILLEGALLY
2
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SEARCHED WITHOUT A WARRANT OR EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES.
A.

Mr. Staten did not give consent for Officer Henninger
to enter his motel room to retrieve the item believed to
be a marijuana pipe.

Although a search pursuant to the consent of a person in an area in which that person
has an expectation of privacy is recognized as an exception to the warrant requirement, the State
has the burden of proving consent was voluntarily given. See State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684
(Utah 1990); State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993); State v. Lovegren. 829 P.*2d 155
(Utah App. 1992). In the present case, Officer Henninger indicated at the preliminary hearing
that Mr. Staten did not give consent to search his motel room, but that Mr. Staten
subsequently did consent to Officer Henninger retrieving what he believed to be a marijuana
pipe. Mr. Staten's testimony at the hearing will be that Officer Henninger asked if he could
look at what he believed to be a marijuana pipe, and Mr. Staten said fine and turned to get the
item (knowing that it was in fact not a marijuana pipe). After Mr. Staten turned to get the
item, Officer Henninger entered the room without Mr. Staten's consent, took the item, placed
handcuffs on Mr. Staten for "officer safety", and left the room to get a warrant.
Shortly after Officer Henninger left the motel room after placing handcuffs on Mr.
Staten purportedly for officer safety, Officer Henninger returned to the room with other officers,
and again illegally entered Mr. Staten's room without a warrant, and proceeded to search the
room. "It is settled that a motel guest is entitled to constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches of his or her room." Stoner v. California. 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964);
United States v. Anthon. 648 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1981). Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court
3
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York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). The Utah Supreme Court has also held that warrantless searches are
per se unreasonable, and therefore, the exclusionary rule would apply to any warrantless
: ;

r -°- wh--1- -• - •• :v'-:ifiec " ••• - -^rrov-' •'•' •" "' : '^ '
This court has held that absent one of a narrow category of
exigent circumstance, warrantless searches are "per se

unreasonable under the fourth amendment." . . . That
principle has as much, if not more, force under the Utah
Constitution."
State v. Gardner. 814 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 1991) (emphasis added). It is undisputed that Mr.
Staten's room was searched without a warrant, and Mr. Staten does not believe that the consent
exception or any other exception applies to the facts of the present case, and therefore, all
evidence which was found pursuant to that warrantless search must be suppressed.
B.

Even if the Court finds that the State has over-come
their burden of proving that Mr. Staten voluntarily
consented to Officer Henninger entering his room to
retrieve the alleged marijuana pipe, the result is the
same.

Even if Mr. Staten gave limited consent for Officer Henniger's inspection of the copper
tubing, that consent did not extend to the patently illegal search that followed. The scope of a
search "is generally defined by its expressed object," Florida v. Jimeno. 500 U.S. 248, 251
(1991), and "is limited by the breadth of the consent given." United States v. McRae. 81 F.3d
1528, 1537 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Pena. 920 F.2d 1509, 1514 (10th Cir. 1990),
cert, denied. 501 U.S. 1207 (1991)). In U.S. v. Beltran. 968 F.2d 21 (10th Cir. (Utah) 1992), the
4
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court decided that Beltran's limited consent for the officer to open the truck "and look at the
furniture" did not permit the subsequent search with a drug-sniffing dog. Though this is an
unpublished opinion and does not constitute stare decisis, the opinion does have persuasive value
on a material issue, and a copy is attached to this document. Staten's purported consent for the
inspection of the tubing did not justify the illegal search that followed.
Furthermore, the illegality of the search of Staten's room cannot be cured by the
consent of the motel management. *\1 jne argument is made tnat the search of tne hotel room,
although conducted without the petitioner's consent, was lawful because it was conducted with
the consent of the night clerk. We find this argument unpersuasive." Stoner v. California, 376
U.S. 483 (1964). In two more cases the Supreme Court held searches unconstitutional despite
the consent of either the proprietor or the assistant manager. See Lustig v. United States, 338
U.S. 74 (1949); and United States v. Jeffers. 342 U.S. 48 (1951). Therefore, even if the motel
management did consent to the search of Mr. Staten's room, it does not cure the illegal
warrantless entry and search.
II.

CONCLUSION
For all the reasons set forth above, Defendant respectfully requests the Court to

suppress all evidence seized in violation to the warrantless search of his motel room.
Dated this ^ f Q day of March, 1997.

Attorney for Defendant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH#
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Plaintiff,
Case No. 971400044
Judge Lynn W. Davis

CHAD STATEN
DOB: 6-28-77
Defendant(s).

Chad Staten is charged with Possession of Methamphetamine with
Intent

to Distribute

in a drug

free

zone, a First Degree

felony;

Possession of Marijuana with intent to distribute in a drug free zone,
a Second Degree felony; Possession of Paraphernalia in a drug free zone,
a

Class A misdemeanor; and Possession of a dangerous weapon by a

restricted

person,

a

Third

Degree

felony.

Defendant

waived his

preliminary hearing and entered pleas of not guilty to the charges on
March 3, 1997. The matter is currently set for trial on May 9, 1997
with a pre-trial conference on May 5, 199 7.

Counsel for the defendant

has filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained in this matter.
FACTS
On December 22, 1996 Officers in Provo were trying to locate Megan
Kearley, a 16 year old runaway.

Officers received information that

Megan might be at the Motel 6 in Provo and that she was thought to be
staying with a male individual by the first name of Chad.

The officer

went to the front desk and described Megan and "Chad" to the person at

. _
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the front desk.

The person at the front desk indicated that they did

have a young female fitting the description staying in room 263 and that
the room was rented to a "Chad Staten".

They gave the officers the

driver1s license number which was used as identification to rent the
room.

The number came back to

nu

~:?

f•--«--*-

The person at the front

desk also said that they thought that Megan had called to the room from
somewhere else a few minutes before.

The officer then went 'across the

street and called room 263 and asked for Megan.

The male individual who

answered the phone said that Megan was not there but should be back
soon.

The male tried to get the officer to give his name and then there

was some discussion in which the officer indicated that it was very
important that he get in touch with Megan.

The male indicated that he

thought he knew what the officer needed and that he might be able to
help him.

The officer then asked defendant if he had some "stuff" to

which the defendant replied that he thought he knew what the officer
needed and that the officer should call back in 10 minutes.
then began calling the narcotics officers and for back-up.

The officer
Before the

other officers arrived, a vehicle drove into the parking lot and a
female fitting Megan's description got out of the vehicle and went into
room 263.

After waiting a few more minutes the officer called room 263

again and talked to Megan and told her that he wanted some "stuff".
said

that

he

should

talk

to

"Chad" and

handed

the

phone

to

She
him.

Defendant told the officer that he could get him some "bitch" meaning
methamphetamine.

The officer told defendant he would be right down.

Megan was then observed leaving room 263 and entering her vehicle.

She

was stopped and placed under arrest as a runaway as she was in her
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vehicle.

Megan asked if she could go back up to room 263.

r~id tb-*- 9-^^ could go bac v to the re
\*ith her.

The officer

and Ftc^red to go up the stairs

•' — she vTrr: coirr no the sT: -..:.::£ Megan starred to scream.

continued to scream as the officer took her back down the stairs.

She
She

was then found to be in possession of methamphetamine which she said she
had gotten from the individual in room 263 of the Motel 6.
•-.a :r

. ,., .....'... •• ... . \

ci:

knocked on the door to the room.

The Officer

:",-.rr fr ;. v,;-rre *Mr.. Hanr--:.:

The officer was to the side where he

could not be seen as the defendant opened the door.

Once the door was

opened the officer stepped out facing the defendant.

From this position

outside the door the officer could see baggies, a copper pipe and
several boxes that said "scales" on them.

The baggies were similar to

the ones that the methamphetamine was in that was found on Meganf s
person.

Tim Hansen pointed to the copper pipe and said, "Look, there is

a marijuana pipe." Defendant denied it was a marijuana pipe and when the
officer asked if the officer could come in to retrieve it, defendant
agreed.

The officer retrieved

attached to a blow torch.

the item which was actually

Next to the torch was a butane lighter and

butane fluid was underneath on the night stand.
under arrest.

tubing

Defendant was placed

Officers inventoried the items in the room and found

several baggies of methamphetamine, marijuana, digital scales, and a
Remington 12 ga.

Which was loaded.

Additional shotgun shells were

located.
ARGUMENT
OFFICERS CAN SEARCH THE ROOM BASED ON EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES AND PLAIN
VIEW.
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Prior to entering the defendant' s room at the motel the officers had
already placed under arrest one of the occupants of the room, Megan
Kearley.

Megan had in her possession, methamphetamine, which she

claimed she had gotten from the defendant.

When Megan was placed in

custody she requested to be allowed to go up to the room where the
defendant was and on her way up the stairs started to scream, giving the
defendant warning that there was a problem.

She continued to scream as

the officers than took her back down the stairs and secured her.

In the

recent case of State v. Wells, 3 04 Utah Advance Reports 6 (November 21,
1996) the Court of Appeals of Utah stated the basis for determining
exigent circumstances.

The court stated,

Utah courts have identified several exigent circumstances that may
justify a warrantless search, including the immediate need to
prevent harm to the officers, destruction of evidence, or escape of
the subject. Wells at 8. (Citations omitted).
All of the above factors are possible in this case given the fact that
Megan was attempting to warn the defendant and that the defendant
already had reason to be suspicious given the phone calls made by the
officer and the fact that he was dealing drugs.
that a suspect may have a weapon . . .
destroyed . . . is insufficient."

"The mere possibility

or that evidence might be

Wells at 8.

The Wells case goes on

to say that the State had failed to even intimate that there was any
immediate concern for safety or destruction of evidence.

Id.

At 8c

Such is not the case here where the co-defendant was already under
arrest and was attempting to warn the defendant.

Had officers waited to

obtain a warrant it is likely that the defendant may have been long
gone.

•_ . 0042

R a t h e r than enter the room at this p o i n t the officers elected to try a n d
talk
door.

tc

zhe

defendant

Once defendant

the ....... ;• .

through

another

individual

who

knocked

came no the door the officer riadf himselr

"...: ""'.. ' rr ri

.

r; :.:. _ "••/a;.;

on

known

the
no

T o l a red l;r -.. -a .a or; e

knocking on the door and by the officer standing outside in the public
area.

From that area, the officer, and the friend of Megan1 s family-

could see something that appeared to be paraphernalia.

The officer then

uskea for consent to go in ana get it and this consent was given by the
defendant.

Both the officer and the other witness will testify that

this occurred thus given the officer permission to be in the room where
he then saw, in plain view, other items of concern.

Defendant was then

placed under arrest for the possession of paraphernalia and based on the
information the officer had obtained from the earlier contact with the
defendant where the defendant had agreed to sell controlled substances.
The subsequent search of the room and finding of controlled substances,
etc. were pursuant to arrest and as part of the inventory of the items
in the room.

State v. Wells at 9 and State v. Austin. 584 P. 2d 853

(Utah 1978).

BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT HAD AGREED TO SELL METHAMPHETAMINE, THE OFFICER
HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST HIM AND SEARCH THE ROOM PURSUANT TO ARREST.

Even prior to the officer approaching the defendant's room the officer
had already engaged defendant in a conversation, by phone in which Megan
identified

the person the officer was speaking to as Chad and the

individual identified agreed to sell the officer controlled substances.

._
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At that point the defendant had already arguably committed the crime of
agreeing to sell controlled substances which gave the officer probable
cause for arrest and to search for the substances.

It was not

unreasonable for the officer to assume that there were controlled
substances in the room since defendant had just agreed to sell him some
from the room and Megan had indicated that she had gotten the substances
from the defendant in Room 263.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the state respectfully

requests that the

defendant's motion to suppress be denied.

Y ATTORNEY
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Attorneys for Defendant
40 South 100 West, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone 379-2570
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STATE OF UTAH,

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Plaintiff,

vs.

CASE NO. 971400044

CHAD STATEN

JUDGE LYNN W. DAVIS
Defendant.

Dciendaiu, CHAD S T A I J D N , through his counsel of record, Randall K. Spencer,
submits the following Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's
Motion to Suppress.
ARGUMENT
I.

MR. STATEN WAS SEIZED AND HIS MOTEL ROOM WAS ILLEGALLY
SEARCHED WITHOUT A WARRANT.
It is undisputed that Defendant's motel room was searched without a warrant, and

"warrantless searches and seizures within a home or other private premises are per se
unreasonable absent exigent circumstances." State v. Beavers. 859 P.2d 9, 13 (Utah App. 1993).
It is also clear that Defendant has an expectation of privacy in his motel room just like his
expectation of privacy in his home. Hoffa v. United States. 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966) (UA hotel
room can clearly be the object of Fourth Amendment protection as much as a home or an
1

0063

office")- The law is also clear that even with probable cause to arrest, an officer cannot enter a
suspect's home or motel room without consent or exigent circumstances. Beavers, 859 p.2d at
13; Pavton v. New York. 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1979). Therefore, in the present case, the State has
the burden of overcoming the presumption of unreasonableness and proving that Officer
Henninger acted pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement such as consent
or probable cause accompanied by exigent circumstances.
A.

THE CONSENT EXCEPTION DOES NOT SAVE THE
UNREASONABLE WARRANTLESS SEARCH.

In order for the State to meet their burden of proving that Defendant consented to the
warrantless search, and therefore, waived his Fourth Amendment rights, the State must show
"clear and positive testimony that the consent was 'unequivocal and specific' and 'freely and
intelligently given'. . . . we indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights and there must be convincing evidence that such rights
were waived" State v. Ham. 910 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah App, 1996) (emphasis added).
Relative to whether Defendant consented to allowing Officer Henninger to enter his
room, relevant testimony was heard at the May 9, 1997 hearing from Officer Henninger,
Timothy Hansen, a citizen witness, and Chad Staten, Defendant. The testimony was
undisputed that in response to Officer Henninger's general desire to search Defendant's motel
room, Defendant clearly and unambiguously stated that Officer Henninger could not search his
room without a warrant. (Suppression Hearing at p. 9, lines 9-12 and p. 41, lines 15-21).
Subsequently, Officer Henninger and Timothy Hansen, who did not know Defendant
and was employed by the Officer to accompany him to the room, noticed an object they
2
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o b j e c t or wive!:k- ddvid interne'; ir retrieve the
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Office- Henninger indicated at the suppression hearing that he asked Defendant, "is
it all right if I can go grab it?", and Defendant said, "Yes." (S.H. at p. 2 9 , lines 8-11).

On

cross-examination, the Officer was asked, "And when you saw the marijuana pipe, you asked
if you could look at it, didn't you?", and the Officer replied, "I did." (S.H. at 34, lines 1618). Officer Henninger's interpretation of the conversation was that he had consent to enter
the room.
Defendant's testimony at the suppression hearing was that, "Yes, I told him he
would have to have a warrant in order to look in [the motel room]," (S.H. at 4 1 , lines 17-18)
and then there was a conversation about the alleged marijuana pipe:
Q: (By Mr. Spencer) And then was there a conversation also
about the pipe?
A: (By Defendant) Yes.
Q: Did you have any objection to him looking at the pipe?
A: N o .
Q: And, how did you intend to let him look at the pipe?
A: I turned around to grab it for him and when I turned around
to hand it to him and I didn't plan on him coming in.
Q: And so when you told him that he could look at the pipe, you
3

didn't have any objection to him looking at the pipe?
A: I was going to hand it to him.
Q: And that is not the way it worked out, is that right?
A: No.
(S.H. at p. 41, line 19 through p. 42, line 10). Therefore, Defendant's intent in telling Officer
Henninger that he could look at the pipe was that Defendant would retrieve the pipe and show
it to him, and not that the Officer could enter the room without a warrant and get the pipe.
Thus, according to Defendant, he did not consent to Officer Henninger entering his motel
room for any reason.
Timothy Hansen's testimony relative to whether Defendant consented to Officer
Henninger entering the motel room to retrieve the pipe is consistent with Defendant's
recollection. Mr. Hansen indicated that when Officer Henninger asked about the pipe,
Defendant said "he could look at the pipe. He didn't stipulate if he could go in or not." (S.H.
at p. 13, lines 16-17).
The facts gleaned from the testimony of the three witnesses who were present when
entry to the motel room was made must be applied to the standard set forth in State v. Ham,
that any waiver of rights must be clear and specific supported by positive testimony and every
reasonable presumption will be made against the waiver of rights. Ham. 910 P.2d at 439. In
the present case, there is no testimony of a clear, specific, unequivocal waiver of rights, and
the Court is bound to resolve the ambiguity of whether Defendant merely consented to Officer
Henninger looking at the pipe from outside the motel room or whether Defendant consented to
Officer Henninger entering the motel room to look at the pipe in favor of the presumption
4
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at the pipe thinking that he would enter the room to look at the pipe, and Defendant said that
Officer Henninger could look at the pipe thinking that he would get the pipe and show it to
Officer Hennhre r --kno\\ r•:;; ihat it was not a marijuana pipe and having previously advised the
Officer that he could not search Defendant's room without a warrant.
The state of mind of Officer Henninger about whether he believed he had consent or
not is irrelevant. According to Ham, it is the state of mind of the person waiving rights that is
the focus of the analysis relative to consent. kL In light of the facts of the present case, this
Court must find as a matter of law that the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment did not
justify the Officer's warrantless entry into Defendant's motel room, and therefore, all evidence
found subsequently, must be suppressed.
Additionally, Officer Henninger testified that after he retrieved the pipe, Defendant
was placed in handcuffs to secure the scene, and Defendant was not arrested until
approximately 20 minutes later when a N.E.T. officer arrived. (S.H. at p. 32 line 25 through
p. 33, line 6). After Defendant was placed in handcuffs for officer's safety, there were
periods of time when everyone left the room but Defendant. Timothy Hansen testified that:
Q: (By Mr. Spencer) And then after Mr. Staten was handcuffed
and the officer retrieved the pipe, the officer left the room as
you recall?
A: (By Timothy Hansen) For a second yes.
Q: And so nobody else was in the room besides Mr. Staten?
5
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A: Yes.
Q: And then were you left there to watch Mr. Staten to make
sure that he didn't run?
A: Yes.
Q: And where did the officer go?
A: To get the other cop.
Q: So did he go down to the first level or did he stay on the
second level of the Motel 6?
A: I think he went down to the first level. I don't know.
Q: But at any rate, you were the only one there to make sure
that Mr. Staten didn't run?
A: Right.
Q: This was after the officer had retrieved the pipe and came
back?
A: Yes.
Q: Came back out of the room?
A: Yes.
Q: How long would you say that you were there watching Mr.
Staten before?
A: Not, maybe a minute, not too long.
(S.H. at p. 10, line 7 through p. 11, line 8). Therefore, after Officer Henninger entered the
room and retrieved the alleged pipe, he subsequently left the room without placing Mr. Staten
6
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most they could have done is requested Mr. Staten to exit the room in order for them to take
their hand-cuffs off of his wrists.
De;.:» »nt"^ uncontroxened testimony also indicates that the officers came and went
from his motel room without consent or arresting Defendant:
Q: (By Mr. Spencer) How much time would you say passed
between the time that you were handcuffed and then placed in
the chair until Officer Billings arrived?
A: (By Mr. Staten) Maybe 20 minutes.
Q: And during that time, was there always an officer inside the
room with you?
A: Not inside the room. He stepped out on the balcony
Q: Did Officer Henninger actually leave the room during part or
some of that time?
A: Yes.
(S.H. at p. 43, lines 14-23). Thus, according to the uncontroverted testimony of Defendant,
after Officer Henninger left the room, the second officer, Officer Woodall, stepped out on the
balcony during the 20 minute wait for the arrival of the N.E.T. officer. Because Defendant
had not been placed under arrest, the officers had no right to come in and out of his motel
room until they ultimately decided to search further and arrest him.
Although valid consent obviates the need for a warrant, Utah Supreme Court
7

0057

holdings promote the maxim that warrants-when-practicable is the best policy. See State v.
Larocco. 794 P.2d 460, 469 (Utah 1990). "[Warrantless searches will be permitted only
where they satisfy their traditional justification, namely, to protect the safety of police or the
public or to prevent the destruction of evidence." HL at 469-70. Additionally, the Utah Court
of Appeals addressed a matter where there was a question as to whether the officers had
received valid consent (in that matter the issue was whether the consent from a third party was
valid, but the rational is the same as the present case):
Neither of these justifications existed in the case at hand. The
officers knew that defendant would be out of town for a few
more days and that there was, therefore, no danger of the
evidence being destroyed or removed. Nor was there any
danger to the public or to the police officers. . . .At a minimum,
the officers should have been concerned about the reality of
[daughter's] authority, despite her claim, when confronted with
the objective indicia that she had no such authority. Such doubts
should have been resolved either by calling [Mother] or,
preferably, by securing a warrant. The best advice remains:
"When in doubt, get a warrant." United States v. Gooch. 603
F.2d 122, 126 n. 3 (10th Cir. 1978).
State v. Elder. 815 P.2d 1341, 1345, n. 5. (Utah App. 1991).
When there is a question as to whether consent has been given, it is the officer's duty
to clarify the consent before relying upon consent to search without a warrant. In the present
case, the fact that Defendant initially advised Officer Henninger that he could not enter
Defendant's motel room and search without a warrant and the ambiguous language in the
subsequent alleged request for consent to look at the pipe demonstrates that there was no valid
waiver of Fourth Amendment rights at any time, and all evidence seized subsequent to the
officers' illegal entries must be suppressed.
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The State argued in its memorandum in opposition to Defendant's motion to suppress
that exigent circumstances justified Officer Henninger's entrance into the motel room. Not
only were there no exigent circumstances at the time of Officer Henninger's entrance into the
motel room, but Officer Henninger's testimony at the suppression hearing and the preliminary
hearing make it clear that he did not enter Defendant' motel room based on the presence of
exigent circumstances, but he entered the room because he allegedly thought, although,
unreasonably, that Defendant had consented to his entering the room. The State's argument
that Megan Kearly was screaming to warn Defendant was inconsistent with Officer
i leiiiiix-^cr's testimony that Megan sia

J scre.-niiing when she saw her brother ana his friend,

and was screaming at them. (S.H. at p. 26 and 27). Officer Henninger testified simply that it
was possible that Defendant heard Megan's screams.
Officer Henninger's thought processes were clearly demonstrated in his testimony.
He wanted Defendant to open the door to the hotel room, and he knew that Defendant would
not open the door for him and that he did not have the right to force Defendant to open the
door. Therefore, Officer Henninger attempted to take Megan to the motel room to entice
Defendant to open the door for Megan, and then the Officer could confront Defendant.
Relative to why Officer Henninger agreed to take Megan to the room, he testified: "I figured
the person in the room that first offered me the narcotics over the phone [would] be more apt
to opening up the door for her instead of a uniformed officer and you know the possibility of
destroying evidence." (S.H. at p. 26, lines 5-8) When Officer Henninger's first plan did not
9
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work out, he subsequently employed Timothy Hansen to go up to the room with him. When
asked why he wanted to go to the room with Tim Hansen, Officer Hen?v>.^ev r'*s:ifie^: s ' n he
exact same reason, if he saw a uniformed officer and he had already offered me narcotics over
the phone and if he saw a uniformed officer he doesn't have to open up the door. He could
just go and flush everything down the toilet." (S.H. at p. 27, lines 21-24).
"Utah courts have identified several exigent circumstances that may justify a
warrantless search, including the immediate need to prevent harm to the officers, destruction of
the evidence, or escape of the suspect." State v. Wells. 928 P.2d 386, 389 (Utah App. 1996).
The state contends that any of those possibilities justified the warrantless search in this instance.
If Officer Henninger believed there was an exigent circumstance such as danger to anyone, he
certainly would not have taken two civilians up to the room. The Defendant was inside a
second floor motel room with at least three officers on the scene, and therefore, the possible
escape of the suspect is not an exigent circumstance that was present. In fact, the only
possible exigent circumstance that Officer Henninger identifies is the possibility that Defendant
may destroy evidence. However, Officer Henninger does not articulate any reasonable
suspicion for this concern other than the possibility in any case that evidence may be
destroyed. "Because '[t]here is almost always a partisan who might destroy or conceal
evidence,' United States v. Davis, 423 F.2d 974, 979 (5th Cir. 1970), the State must show
more than 'a mere possibility that evidence might be removed,' People v. Blasius. 459
N.W.2d 906, 916 (Mich. 1990). The State failed to present evidence 'that even intimated that
the officers reasonably believed that destruction, removal or concealment of contraband
material was imminent or threatened.' State v. Peterson. 525 S.W.2d 599, 607 (Mo.Ct.App.
10
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motel room, and cannot have been created by the officers' own actions. See Beavers, 859 P.2d
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and cannot justify a subsequent

entry into the home to retrieve an object that appeared to be a marijuana pipe. It is cl^ar that
Officer Henninger's entry into the home was not to out of fear for safety or loss of evidence,
but was for the purpose of gathering evidence pursuant to the purported consent of Defendant.
Clearly, the exception of exigent circumstances ciue^ not justify Officer Henninger's
warrantless entry into Defendant's room.
If the Court should find any exigent circumstance, any such exigent circumstance
was created by the efforts of Officer Henninger to entice Defendant to open the door to the
motel room by bringing up two separate civilians to knock on the door as discussed above.
III.

THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST EXCEPTION ALSO DOES NOT
APPLY TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE
The only circumstance where the search incident to arrest doctrine would even be

relevant to the present case would be if the Court denies Defendant's motion based on the fact
that the officers did not have either consent or exigent circumstances to enter Defendant's
room. However, even the search incident to arrest doctrine does not justify the search made in
the present case. Officer Henninger and Billings did not even claim that they conducted a
11
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search incident 10 arrest. However, they claimed that they did an inventory search at the
request of Motel 6 management not a search incident to arrest. (See testimony of Officer
Billings at the preliminary hearing held on February 24, 1997 p. 27, line 17 through p. 28,
line 2; and testimony of Officer Henninger at S.H. at p. 30, line 17 through p. 31 line 10). As
argued in Defendant's primary memorandum, Motel 6 management did not have authority to
consent to the search of Defendant's room, and Defendant is not aware of any exception to the
warrant requirement which allows an inventory search without a warrant to be conducted at a
motel room. Therefore, the evidence found must be suppressed.
Relative to searches incident to arrest in general, a warrantless search may be
conducted incident to an arrest for two specific reasons: (1) to prevent the arrestee from
obtaining weapons or (2) destroying evidence. Chimel v. California. 395 U.S. 752, 766
(1969); State v. Wells. 928 P.2d 386, 390 (Utah App. 1996); State v. Austin. 584 P.2d 853,
855 (Utah 1978). The scope of the search is very limited until a warrant is obtained—
consisting of the grab area of a defendant and objects in plain view. "The prevailing view is
that when a warrantless search is justified, any evidence seized 'in plain view' will be
admissible." Austin at 856. In State v. Wells, the court held that the search was unreasonable
because the evidence was discovered in a jacket lining in another room, and was therefore not
in plain view.
In the present case, Defendant had been hand-cuffed and left in the room for at least
20 minutes before the officers decided to arrest and search him. Officer Henninger conducted
a search for weapons and for his safety at the time he initially placed hand-cuffs on Defendant,
and located the shotgun—this was apparently a quasi-search incident to arrest. After Defendant
12
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If the court finds that the inventory search was also a search incident to arrest, the
officers exceeded the scope of a search incident to arrest. A search of the area within the
arrestee's immediate control may be conducted to check for weapons and preserve evidence.
See Chimel v. California. 395 U.W. 752, 763, 766 (1969); and State v. Wells. 928 P.2d 386,
390 (Utah App. 1996). Defendant was handcuffed (had been for at least 20 minutes), at least
three officers were present, and the controlled substances were found in the inside pocket of a
zipped planner and inside the handle of an ice scraper. (S.H. at p. 44, lines 2-17 and p. 35,
lines 4-15) The evidence was not readily accessible to Defendant. The evidence was in no
danger of being destroyed. The State must prove "under Chimel. that defendant was or
anyone else would be within a range close enough to obtain possession [or] destroy the
evidence or that the officers were reasonably checking for weapons." Wells. 928 P.2d at 391.
In consideration of the facts of this case, it is clear that the officers were conducting an
unjustified inventory search without a warrant and not a search incident to arrest.
IV-

CONCLUSION
For aSi the reasons set forth above, Defendant respec;fully reqaests the Court to

suppress all evidence seized in the warrantless search of his motel room.
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Dated this
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day of May, 1997.

vRandall K. Spence?
Attorney for Defendant
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered a copy of the foregoing to the Office of
the Utah County Attorney, 100 East Center, Suite 2100, Provo, UT 84606, this T day of.
*~TiW
1997.
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